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DISPOSITION IN A DISCRETIONARY
REGIME: PUNISHMENT AND
REHABILITATION IN THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM
CATHERINE J. ROSS *
INTRODUCTION
Discretion elicits an ambiguous response in Anglo-American cul-
ture. On the one hand, discretion may be identified with qualities of
responsiveness, unstrained mercy and flexibility, all testifying to the
moral capacity and integrity imputed to the person who wields it. On
the other hand, if unbridled, discretion raises the specter of unre-
strained authority, abuse of power, and illegitimacy antedating the
procedural protections in our Constitution. In no legal sphere are the
strains between the possible virtues of discretion and the rational
protections of procedure more pronounced than in the realm of juve-
nile justice. One judge has recently gone so far as to label the system
"schizophrenic."'
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the parameters
of discretion in the sentencing (or "disposition") of children found to
have committed delinquent acts: that is, acts that would violate the
criminal law if committed by an adult. 2 Even as the criminal justice
system has moved toward longer and less flexible sentences for adults,
the disposition of adjudicated delinquents remains largely discretionary. 3
*Visiting Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School, B.A. Yale 1971, Ph.D. Yale 1977,
J.D. Yale 1987. The author thanks Boston College Law School for its support, Edward E. Madden,
Jr. and Marya Rose.for valuable research assistance, and Robert Bloom, Robert Schwartz, Francine
Sherman, Aviam Soifer and Mark Soler for comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript.
tin re K.B., 619 A.2d 798, 800 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (Cirillod.).
2
 Juvenile courts consider a wide range of problems. Many arise from circumstances unre-
lated to the child's own behavior (such as custody or foster care arrangements) or do not relate
to violations of criminal codes (for example, "status offenses" like missing school or staying out
late). Those aspects of juvenile court jurisdiction, and the separate theoretical issues they raise,
are beyond the scope of this essay.
BABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., A CALL FOR JUSTICE.: AN ASSESSMENT OF AccEss
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 36-37 (1995) (courts
have "very broad discretion" in ordering disposition for juveniles, and disposition remains the
"primary feature that distinguishes the juvenile system from the adult criminal court"). In
contrast, when Congress authorized promulgation of federal sentencing guidelines for adults, it
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In this essay, I consider the role of discretion and disposition in a
modern jurisprudence of juvenile justice. I do so primarily by revisiting
the foundation cases of the modern juvenile justice system: Kent v.
United States and In re Gault. Those cases provided the framework for
a jurisprudence of juvenile justice that sought to rein in the extraordi-
nary discretion traditionally accorded juvenile courts. Yet they also
sought to preserve flexibility, which was valued for its potential to
respond to individualized circumstances. In the context of fears about
rampant juvenile crime and social breakdown today, many critics of
our juvenile justice system have transformed the foundation cases and
the regime they inaugurated into symbols of reckless disregard for
responsible disposition and public safety. They charge the new regime
with seeking myriad extraneous ends—the unbridled rights of chil-
dren, sociological jurisprudence, therapeutic ideology, and other goals
deemed to undervalue responsibility, accountability, and the security
of the citizenry. This depiction of juvenile justice ignores the pragmatic
balancing that characterized the reasoning in the foundation cases. It
also overlooks the primacy of responsible disposition as a normative
value and practical concern in the evolution of juvenile jurisprudence.
Viewed in their proper context, the other ideals that distinguish juve-
nile justice—including rehabilitation—actually are conditioned on the
use of appropriate sanctions.
I. DISCRETION UNDER FIRE
From its origins nearly a century ago, the juvenile court rested on
a few simple premises: children are different from adults, and their
different capacities and status require special treatment under the law,
even if they have violated criminal codes. All children were believed to
be redeemable.4
 Juvenile court advocates hoped that a specialized
forum providing individualized attention would link children to appro-
priate rehabilitative services needed for their healthy development..'
The rehabilitative ideal of juvenile courts, their founders proclaimed,
expressly sought to rein in the "almost unfettered discretion" historically available to federal
judges at sentencing, and to replace it with categorical "retributive, educational, deterrent and
incapacitative goals." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364, 367 (1989) (discussing Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984, as amended, 18 U.S.C..§§ 3551-98 (1994) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98
(1988 Sc Stipp. V 1993)).
4 See, e.g., ANTHONY M. PLATT', THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2c1 ed.
1977); ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT (1978);
STEVEN SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
"PROGRESSIVE" JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1825-1920 (1977).
5 ABA PRESIDENTIAL. WORKING GROUP ON THE UNMET LEGAL. NEEDS OF CHILDREN AND THEIR
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was best served by wide judicial discretion. The courts would be so
benevolent that the need for procedural protections would disappear.
According to this view, juvenile courts translated into action the com-
mon law theory of parens palriae so that the government, as ultimate
parent and guardian of all children, cared for all children who needed
protection! An avuncular judge, vested with wide discretion and im-
parting moral vision, would be able to steer the errant child onto the
right path, reinforcing advice with authority to compel participation
in rehabilitative programs (including institutionalization) for as long
as necessary to accomplish reformation of the child's character.?
The unvarnished paternalism of the early juvenile courts ulti-
mately faced challenges on several fronts. For much of the last thirty
years, critiques by rights theorists and child advocates have focused on
the struggle between unbridled discretion and rational procedure, a
clash forecast by Roscoe Pound's earlier observation that "[t] he powers
of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our
juvenile courts." Beginning in 1966, the Supreme Court attempted to
define a balance between the promise of the rehabilitative ideal, which
appeared to demand and justify judicial discretion, and the claim for
sufficient procedural protections under the Constitution to ensure
fundamental fairness. Because juvenile courts promised certain protec-
tions for children that were absent from the criminal courts—among
them a preference for confidentiality, the sealing of records, and ter-
mination of the court's jurisdiction when the child reaches majority—
the accused delinquent came to have a significant interest, and some-
times a statutory right, in having his or her case adjudicated in juvenile
court.`'
FAMILIES, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION 59 (1993)
[hereinafter Cti Limas Al. RISK].
'3
 See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A, 198, 201 (Pa. 1905) (upholding constitutionality of a
statute governing the judicial power to commit children under age 16 to institutions as being
designed "not for the punishment of offenders, but for the salvation of Children"); RYERSON,
Supra note 4, at 63-68; Claudia Worrell, Pretrial Detention of Juveniles: Denial of Equal Protection
Masked by the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 174, 176-78 (1985).
7
 Others have imalyeed whether the origins of the juvenile court lie in beneficence or the
desire for social control, a question beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Sanford J. Fox,
Juvenilefustice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187 (1970); supra note 4 (citing
authorities).
8
 Roscoe Pound, Foreword to the First Edition of PAULINE YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN
PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY atxv (2c1 ed. 1960) (rust edition cited in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
18 n.24 (1967)).
9 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966); Wallace J. Mlynitc, Juvenile Delinquent
or Adult Convict—The. Prosecutor's Choice, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 93 (1976).
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Beginning with Kent and Gault, a series of Supreme Court decisions
have gone far toward remedying the glib assumption that the pro-
claimed good intentions of the juvenile court's founders sufficiently
protected children and obviated the need for due process rights. Mi-
nors before a juvenile court accused of behavior that can result in
confinement now have the constitutional right to the following safe-
guards: representation by counsel, 1 ° notice of charges," confrontation
and cross-examination of witnesses,' 2 protection against self-incrimina-
tion,'" protection from double jeopardy,' 4
 proof of delinquency charges
"beyond a reasonable doubt,"'' and protection from judicial transfer
to criminal court without hearing, without effective assistance of coun-
sel, and without a statement of reasons. 16 The Supreme Court, however,
has also held that minors are not entitled to the full panoply of
procedural protections available to adults—minors in juvenile courts
have no constitutional right to a jury trial," may be detained prior to
trial on a far lower standard than would apply to an adult,' 8 and may
be subjected to far greater judicial discretion in disposition than adults
in comparable circumstances.' 6
The juvenile courts that have resulted in most states are hybrids
that reflect the series of compromises underlying their unique struc-
ture. They exist in a twilight, neither wholly bound by the constitu-
tional norms of criminal procedure nor convincingly "civil" and reha-
bilitative as envisioned by their founders. The post-Gault juvenile court
is characterized by unresolved conflicts between the urge to allow
judicial discretion where it serves the purposes of rehabilitation and
demands for procedural protections; between the rehabilitative goal
10 Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
11 Id. at 33.
12 Id. at 57.
13 Id. at 55. Minors may also have a right to creation of a record in proceedings that can
result in confinement. Id. at 57-58 (not reaching the issue because, in part, it is not clear that
the Constitution requires state to provide appellate review but expressly noting that the case
illustrates the dire "consequences of failure to provide an appeal, to record the proceedings, or
to make findings").
14 Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).
15 /n re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
16 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966).
17 McK.eiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). Some states provide jury trials in
juvenile court. Irene M. Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court
Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L REV. 163, 170 n.36 (listing 13 states that give minors the right to a jury
trial as a matter of state law, and four more that provide a limited right or judicial discretion to
grant a jury trial in juvenile court).
18
 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 (1984).
15 ./n re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31 n.48 (1967).
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and societal demands for retribution; and between idealistic hopes and
realistic disappointments.
Dissatisfaction with the juvenile justice system is intensified by
perceptions of pervasive juvenile crime," and by the related phenome-
non of an unprecedented number of juvenile offenders in confine-
ment. 2 ' Many citizens doubt that juvenile courts can protect the public
or that they impose appropriate sanctions on violent juvenile offend-
ers. 22
 These circumstances have encouraged critics of juvenile justice
to cast the jurisprudential debate as a narrow one between an ethereal
commitment to abstract rights and what they see as their own more
grounded concern with punishment: the need to ensure certain pun-
ishment, a punishment commensurate with the crime, and a punish-
ment that will protect society from future violations."
" Statistics provide support for the public perception that serious and violent crime by
juveniles is rising. See Elizabeth F. Emmons ct. al., Preventing Juvenile Delinquency An Ecological,
Developmental Approach, in CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND GOVERNMENT: PREPARING FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST Citivatity (Edward Zigler et al. eds., forthcoming) (citing authorities). The Federal Bureau
of Investigation cites an increase of about 60% in arrests of persons under 18 years of age for
murder and nonnegligent manslaughter during the 1980's. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INvEsTIGATioN,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT FOR THE UNITED STATES 279 (1991). But a recent analysis of justice
Department data suggests that concerns over mounting juvenile crime are exaggerated by, among
other things: the failure to note either the relatively low proportion of juvenile arrests attributable
to "serious" crimes (5% for juveniles compared with 15% for adults); failure to understand that
the most violent crimes of murder and rape combined represent less than one half of one percent
of juvenile arrests; and the tendency of youngsters to commit crimes in groups, so that statistics
reflect the number of individual children arrested, not the smaller number of crimes they
committed. MICHAEL A. JONES & BARRY KRISBERG, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELIN-
QUENCY, IMAGES AND REALITY: JUVENILE CRIME, YOUTH VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY '23 (1994).
Further, a small proportion of juvenile offenders is responsible for the bulk of all serious and
violent juvenile crime. Department ofjustice and Delinquency Prevention, Final Comprehensive
Plan for Fiscal Year 1994 and Notification of Availability of the Fiscal Year 1994 Competitive
Discretionary Assistance Program and Application Kit, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,980-36,002 (1994); Robert
Wright, The Biology of Violence, THE NEw YORKER, Mar. 13, 1995, at 70 (79% of repeat violent
offenses are committed by 7% of youth).
21 The number of confined juveniles reached a record high of 690,00(1 in 1990, the last year
for which figures are available. CHILDREN AT RISK, supra note 5, at 60. The Office of Juvenile
justice and Delinquency Prevention continues to rely on data collected in June 1990. OFFICE OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILES TAKEN INTO CUSTODY: FISCAL YEAR
1992 (1995).
22 A Gallup Organization poll conducted on behalf of Cable News Network and USA Thday
in September 1994 found that 72% of adults surveyed believed that the juvenile justice system
was "not very successful" or "not successful at all" in controlling juvenile crime; fully 68% of all
persons surveyed thought that juveniles who commit violent crimes should be "treated the same
as adults," Roper Center for Public Opinion Research 1995, available in Westlaw, POLL database.
"E.g., In re K.B., 639 A.2d 798, 806 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) ("If these young miscreants want
all the adult rights, perhaps we should give them all the adult punishments concomitant with
them."); Charles E. Springer, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ti & PUB.
POLY, 397 (1991).
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These concerns cut across ideological, jurisprudential, and politi-
cal lines. The renewed emphasis on the responsibilities that accom-
pany rights illustrates the new flavor of the debate. 24 Speaker Gingrich
pushes "personal responsibility" as the panacea for social ills. 25
 But
President Clinton also refers to a "New Covenant" in which personal
responsibility alone allows one to take advantage of proffered oppor-
tunity. 2" And the Reverend Jesse Jackson reiterates to the poor: " [y] ou
are not responsible for being down . . . you are responsible for stand-
ing up."27
 From the perspective of individual responsibility, the discre-
tion accorded juvenile court judges can as easily be abused by solicitous
respect for the delinquent and promises of treatment as by long sen-
tences untamed by standards. The dominant critique of juvenile courts
has shifted from its earlier focus on the rights of juveniles to a discus-
sion based on quite different premises.
Popular fear of juvenile crime and dissatisfaction with juvenile
courts are expressed most dramatically in legislation in every state that
allows prosecution as adults of minors accused of serious or violent
offenses.28
 Such statutes allow the removal to criminal court of expand-
ing categories of minors charged with acts that would constitute serious
crimes if committed by adults. 2" Today, only three states and the District
24 E.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
(1991).
25
 Representative Newt Gingrich, A Vision for America, Address to GOPAC (Nov. 14, 1994)
(GOPAC is a political action committee supporting Rep. Gingrich).
26 Clinton Touts Government as "Partner;"
 WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1995, at A6; see also President
Bill Clinton, Remarks to the 86th Annual Holy Convocation of the Church of God in Christ,
Memphis, Tenn. (Nov. 13, 1993) (unpublished transcript, on file with the author) (government
cannot fight crime alone, "we have to reach deep inside to the values, the spirit, the soul").
27 Quoted in Naomi Wolf, Women, Money and Power, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1994, at 4.
28
 Enabling statutes have long provided for transfer of chronic, mature, or violent juvenile
offenders to adult criminal court. According to the federal Office of Juvenile,Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention ("OJJDP"), serious juvenile offenders are those adjudicated delinquent for
committing any felony offense. John J. Wilson & James C. Howell, Serious and Violent Juvenile
Crime: A Comprehensive Strategy, 45 Juv. & FAM. GT. J. No. 2 1994, at 3, 13 n.l. "Violent juvenile
offenders" are serious juvenile offenders adjudicated delinquent for homicide, rape or other
sexual felony offenses, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery or aggravated assault. Id. The ability to
transfer minors accused of such serious offenses to criminal court may be viewed as a "safety
valve" that protects the very existence of the juvenile court by defusing passions surrounding high
profile cases. Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a Place
for Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 57, 62-63 (1992).
28
 Methods of transferring a juvenile to the criminal court fall into three primary categories:
(i) judicial discretion exercised by the juvenile court after a hearing consistent with Kent
("waiver"); (ii) prosecutorial discretion to file in either court; and (iii) mandated transfer for
enumerated offenses (vesting discretion in the prosecutor in determining the terms of indict-
ment) and/or prior adjudication for specified delinquent acts. See Utah v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991,
1002-04 (Utah 1995) (overturning act giving prosecutor unguided discretion to file charges in
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of Columbia expressly bar criminal prosecution of minors aged fifteen
or younger." In what may be viewed as an excess of zeal, forty-one states
now allow or require transfer of children fourteen years old or younger
to criminal court under certain conditions. 31
 In Indiana, for example,
either criminal or juvenile court as violating State Constitution). Only a prior hearing comports
with the recommendation in the Juvenile justice Standards that trials of all persons under age
18 should commence in juvenile court. STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSEER BETWEEN COURTS
g 1.1 (A)-(B) (1980).
741 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 , § 1010 (1995); HAW. Ray. STAT. § 571-22 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 62.080 (1995). The underlying approach of transferring certain juveniles to criminal court is
not. new. Martin L. Forst & Marffia-Elie Bloomquest, Cracking Doom on Juveniles: Changing
ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NO'I'RE DAME J.L. ETHICS & Putt. Pol.'Y 323, 338 (1991); Francis
B. McCarthy, The Serious ()limier and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case far Prosecutorial Waiver of
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 Sr. Louis U. U. 629, 653 (1994) (noting that Pennsylvania
excluded accused murderers from juvenile court jurisdiction as early as 1933). Respected juvenile
justice experts, however, including the drafters of the IJA/ABA juvenile Justice Standards, rec-
ommend that no child should be tried in an adult court for a crime committed before the age
of 15. STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS § 1.1 (A)—(B) (1980).
SI As of August 31, 1995, state codes authorize or require transfer as follows: ALA. Corm:
§ 12-15-34 (1994) (age 14) (act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult);
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (1990) (no MilliMUM age) (minor is delinquent. and not amenable to
treatment); ARIZ. R. Juv. P. 12-14 (no minimum age) (public offense) (rebuttable presumption
of nonamenability ifjuvenile is 16 and committed murder, aggravated assault with deadly weapon,
sexual assault with deadly weapon, or committed class 1, 2, 3, or 4 felony and has four prior
delinquent findings at least one of which is considered "serious"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318
(Michie 1993) (age 14) (capital murder, murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree,
kidnapping in the first degree, aggravated robbery, rape, battery in the first degree, possession
of a hand gun on school property, or aggravated assault committed with a deadly weapon); CALM
& INST. CODE § 707 (West 1995) (age 14) (a detailed enumeration including murder, arson,
violent sex crimes, drug felonies, violent felonies, and fire-arms related felonies); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN, § 19-2-806 (West 1999) (age 14) (felony); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 461)-127 (1995) (age
14) (murder, a single felony constituting a "serious juvenile offense," or various combinations of
offenses); FIA. STAT. ch . 39.022 (1994) (no minimum age, capital offense) (age 14, violation of
Florida law); CA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-39 (1994) (age 13, capital offense, age 15, other offenses);
trAmo Coca; § 16-1806, 1806A (1994) (age 14) (mandatory for violent crimes and drug offimses
near schools, pertnissive for other offenses that would be a crime if committed by an adult); 705
ILCS 405/5-4 (West Stipp. 1995) (age 13) (act that constitutes a crime under the laws of State);
[No. Comm § 31-6-2-4 (1994) (age 10, murder, age 14, heinous or repetitive offense); IOWA CODE
§ 232.45 (1994) (age 14) (public. offense); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1630 (1993) (age 14) (felony);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635.020 (Baldwin 1994) (age 19) (capital offense, Class A or B felony or
felony with a firearm); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3101 (West 1993) (no minimum age)
(murder or Class A, B, or C crime); MD. CODE ANN., Ors, & jun. Peoc. § 3-817 (1995) (under
age 15) (capital offense); MASS. Gast. L. ch. 119, § 61 (1994) (age 14) (felony involving threat
or infliction of serious bodily harm or felony committed by child previously committed to
department of youth services); MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (1994) (age 14) (mandatory for first degree
murder, discretionary for other felonies); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-23-31 (1993) (age 13) (felony);
Mo. Ray. STAT. § 211.071 (1994) (age 14) (felony); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 41-5-206 (1994) (age
12) (sexual intercourse without consent, deliberate homicide, mitigated deliberate homicide, or
attempted deliberate or mitigated homicide); NEB, REV. STAT. § 43-276 (1994) (under 16)
(felonies, misdemeanors or violations of city or village ordinances which are not traffic offenses);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B;29 (1994) (no minimum age) (felony); NJ. REV. STAT. § 2A:4A-26
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children as young as ten years old who are charged with murder or
manslaughter "shall" be waived to criminal court. 32
 Twelve states do
not set any minimum age for criminal prosecution." At least one of
those states—Oklahoma—expressly allows children tried as adults to
"be incarcerated with the adult population" upon conviction regardless
of their age.34
The parameters of legislative and jurisprudential choices are con-
strained by the erroneous assumption that we are confronted by stark,
mutually exclusive choices: rehabilitation or punishment, therapy or
retribution, rights or responsibilities. 35
 This assumption is both prem-
(1994) (age 14) (a detailed enumeration including criminal homicide, first degree robbery,
aggravated sexual assault, aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated arson, repeat offender, car
theft, or selling drugs in school zone); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-20 (Michie 1995) (no minimum
age) (adult crime); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.75 (McKinney 1993) (criminal court has original
jurisdiction over age 13, murder, and age 14, first degree kidnapping, first degree assault, first
degree manslaughter, first degree rape, first degree sodomy, aggravated sexual assault, first degree
burglary, first or second degree robbery, first or second degree arson, attempted second degree
murder, or attempted first degree kidnapping); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (Supp. 1994) (age 13)
(felony); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (Supp. 1995) (age 14) (act or threat of serious bodily
harm); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1112 (1994) (no minimum age) (felony); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 6302, 6355 (1994) (all murder trials in criminal court, age 14 for all other offenses); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 19-1-7 (1993) (no minimum age) (felony); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-430 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1994) (no minimum age, murder or sexual assault; age 14, Class A, 13, C or D felony or
felony punishable by a maximum of 15 years); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 26-11-4 (Supp. 1995)
(no minimum age) (felony); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-134 (Stipp. 1994) (under 16) (first or
second degree murder, rape, aggravated robbery, kidnapping); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-25
(Supp. 1995) (age 14) (felony); Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5506 (1991) (age 10) (arson causing
death, assault and robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault and robbery causing bodily injury,
aggravated assault, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, sexual assault, aggravated sexual
assault, burglary of sleeping apartments); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (Michie Supp. 1995) (age
14) (felony); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10 (Supp. 1995) (age 14) (treason, murder, robbery with a
deadly weapon, kidnapping, first degree arson, first degree sexual assault, or any felony provided
the child had two prior findings of delinquency for acts which would be felonies if committed by
an adult, or a prior delinquent finding for an offense which would be a violent felony if committed
by an adult); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.18 (West Supp. 1994) (age 14) (enumerated felonies); Wyo.
STAT. § 14-6-237 (Supp. 1995) (no minimum age) (delinquent act).
52
 IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4 (1994).
"Alaska, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota and Wyoming. See supra note 31. West Virginia set
no minimum age until 1995. See id.
" OKLA. STAT. tit. 1O, § 1112(C).
35
 Recently, some juvenile justice experts have tried to break down the barriers between the
retributive and rehabilitative models of juvenile justice (which they erroneously attribute to
internal contradictions in the juvenile justice system) by promoting a "balanced" approach.
Under this model, treatment is combined with an emphasis on accountability and protecting the
public. They challenge the over-reliance on institutionalization of juvenile offenders, which they
attribute to the lack of adequate community-based programs. Instead, they urge adoption of
techniques that help the offender to understand the effect of crime on its victims, and meaningful
restitution programs through which the offender can repay both the victim and the community.
See, e.g., WILLIAM H. BARTON ET AL., A BLUEPRINT FOR YOUTH CORRECTIONS (1991) (research
conducted for the Center for the Study of Youth Policy, University of Michigan School of Social
September 1995]	 PUNISHMENT A10 REHABILITATION
	 1045
ised on and has contributed to a peculiarly restrictive reading of the
current juvenile justice regime and the seminal cases which gave birth
to it. It has too often appeared as if Kent and Gault mindlessly focused
on abstract rights at the expense of public safety obtained through
meaningful disposition designed to punish and deter. Yet when we turn
to the details of those cases, it becomes apparent that Kent and Gault
clearly focused on disposition. The Justices sought to balance propor-
tional retribution with treatment as they laid out their vision of a
modern juvenile jurisprudence.
II. THE LEGACY OF KENT AND GAULT
For critics of all stripes, disposition underlies the controversy over
juvenile justice. On the one hand, those who draw from a rights model
criticize the juvenile justice system for failing to give minors who face
adjudication for delinquency the full panoply of constitutional rights
due to adults. Their criticism derives both from a principled devotion
to rights and from their perception that juvenile courts often strip
young people of liberty under the guise of rehabilitation." 8
On the other hand, opponents of leniency decry the failure of the
juvenile justice system to stem a rising tide of youth crime and vio-
lence.s1
 They have attacked the juvenile court for what they see as its
fixation on procedural protections for the young. One judge sums the
problem up as "Gaultmania," which he defines as "the unnecessary
overuse of formalized criminal procedures, lawyers and judges" in
juvenile court."8
 As a result, he charges, such courts are "filled with
lawyers, and bewildered little waifs . . . standing with blank faces listen-
ing to a robed figure reciting an incomprehensible litany of constitu-
Work); GORDON BAZEMORE & MARK S. UMBREIT, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, BALANCED AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, PROGRAM SUMMARY (1994); Gordon
Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, Rethinking the Sanctioning Function in Juvenile Court; Retributive or
Restorative Responses to Youth Crime, 41 CRIME & DF.LINQ. 296, 298 (1995) ("[T]he punitive model
and the traditional treatment model are not the only options for the juvenile court."); Dennis
Maloney et al., The Balanced Approach to Juvenile Probation, 39 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. No. 3 1988, 1,
5-11; see also infra note 113.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 529, 557-72 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(juveniles facing incarceration—in this instance up to 5 or 10 years in confinement—have a
constitutional right to a jury trial); Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: A Response
to the Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition, ante, Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile
Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691 (1991).
37
 E.g., Springer, supra note 23, at 403; see also WILLIAM W. TREANOR & ADRIENNE F.. VOLENIK,
THE NEW RIGHT'S JUVENILE CRIME AND JUSTICE AGENDA FOR THE STATES: A LEGISLATOR'S
BRIEFING Boos 14-30 (1987) (describing and criticizing the heavily retributive 'just deserts"
model juvenile code developed by the Rose Institute and the American Legislative Exchange
Council in 1987 under a grant from the 0.1110).
"Springer, supra note 23, at 405 & n.36.
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tional rights."" The "little waifs" appearing in juvenile courts, he insists,
are nearly always guilty of the offense attributed to them. 4° In the
ensuing "panic" over rights, this social order theorist argues, "criminals
are treated like children" and are not held accountable for their actions. 4 '
By depicting the choices in such polar terms, proponents of both
schools of thought belittle the complexity of the vision in the founda-
tion cases.
As I shall demonstrate, sensibility about equitable disposition was
central to the reasoning of the seminal cases that set forth the juris-
prudential basis of the modern juvenile court. Kent, In re Gault and
their progeny collectively pieced together the peculiar regime that
defines modern juvenile justice. Despite the pivotal significance of Kent
and Gault, commentators and courts alike have generally ignored the
facts that led to the procedural holdings in those cases. By doing so,
they have overlooked how important disposition was to the balancing
process that determined what procedures were due to minors charged
with delinquent acts. The following analysis of the foundation cases
highlights the Court's consistent concern with the unrestrained discre-
tion that too frequently characterized the disposition of juveniles in
the old regime.
In both Kent and Gault, the Court concluded that the disposition
by the trial court violated the ephemeral yet basic concept often de-
scribed as "fundamental fairness." 42 Fundamental fairness, in the juve-
nile context, emerges as a blend of the appropriate level of retributive
justice—dispensed to punish a triggering act and to deter similar acts
in the future by the same actor or by others—and the discretion to
mete out individualized justice in the form of rehabilitation. 43
114 Id. at 405 n.36.
40 Id. at 414 ("[T]he fact that almost all juveniles who are brought before the court on
delinquency charges have in truth committed the crime charged is a fact that we should not be
required to ignore."). This is also true, of course, of most adults charged with crimes who are or
plead guilty. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-
1993, at 530, 546 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994) (88.5% of persons sentenced
in federal court entered a plea of guilty, while only one percent of those indicted on felony
charges were acquitted after trial).
41 Springer, supra note 23, at 405-08.
42 The presenting issue, of course, was the process that led to the disposition. In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 19 (1967) (failure to observe "fundamental requirements of due process" has resulted
in "arbitrariness" and "unfairness to individuals"); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966)
("substantial degree of discretion" accorded juvenile court "does not confer . . . a license for
arbitrary procedure"); see also Gault, 387 U.S, at 72 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) ("fundamental fairness" requires only notice, access to counsel and a written record or its
equivalent).
43 See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Youth Crime and the Choice Between Rules and Standards, B.Y.U. L.
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Kent involved a minor transferred from juvenile to criminal court
for the apparent, albeit unspoken, purpose of subjecting him to a
longer period of confinement." The juvenile court judge apparently
worried about how to frame an appropriate disposition from the mo-
ment sixteen-year-old Morris Kent appeared in 1961 charged with
committing several robberies and rapes.45 Morris had been in and out
of the juvenile justice system since the age of fourteen and remained
on probation in his mother's custody as a result of prior housebreak-
ings and an attempted purse snatching. The juvenile court assumed
that limited juvenile facilities and Morris's aging out of the court's
jurisdiction rendered juvenile justice unable to accomplish rehabilita-
tion. Here we have the kind of case that seizes the public imagination:
pretrial evaluations indicated that Morris suffered from schizophrenia,
could not receive adequate treatment in juvenile facilities, and might
pose a risk to society if released at age twenty-one. The juvenile court
apparently concluded that the only way to achieve jurisdiction over
Morris beyond age twenty-one was to waive juvenile jurisdiction and
transfer him for criminal proceedings. It did so, the Supreme Court
held, "without hearings, without effective assistance of counsel, without
a statement of reasons"—thereby depriving Morris of due process.""
While awaiting trial in criminal court, Morris spent nearly one year in
prison without benefit of any psychiatric treatment." The criminal
court sentenced Morris to thirty-to-ninety years following his conviction
on housebreaking and robbery charges.° The jury found Morris not
guilty by reason of insanity on the rape counts, resulting in his com-
mitment sine die to a psychiatric hospital.'"
In a majority opinion byfustice Fortis, the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded for a de novo hearing on the waiver consistent with
REV. 351, 353-67 (1091) (citing, among others, ROM:Will UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS
88-91 (1975) on the comparison of regimes of "legal" and "substantive" justice). The creative
dispositions that maximize the positive attributes of juvenile court discretion may be thought of
as a kind of individualized distributive justice. Through disposition, such thinking runs, collective
resources are redistributed to the children whose 'allures demonstrate their special neediness.
See Springer, supra note 23, at 408-09 (juvenile courts administer "distributive" justice composed
of "care, guidance, control and discipline," as well as retributive justice).
44
 383 U.S. at 543. The question of which procedures should govern such transfers is even
more significant today than it was when Kent was decided. State and federal legislators have
expanded the categories of minors who may be transferred to criminal court for trial. See supra
notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
45
 Kent v. United States, 401 F.2d 408, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
46 Kent, 383 U.S. at 554.
47 Kent, 401 F.2d at 411-12.
45 Kent, 383 U.S. at 550.
45 Id. at 550, 565 n.38.
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"procedural regularity.”50 The Court held that the federal statute that
created the District of Columbia's juvenile court jurisdiction created a
right for an accused juvenile to have the advantage of juvenile court
proceedings.''
In Kent, the Supreme Court measured the child's interest in ap-
pearing before a juvenile court as the potential "difference between
five years' confinement and a death sentence."52 The Court suggested
an inherent rationality in distinguishing between minors and adults by
limiting the sentence to which children could be exposed. The Court
surely never meant that the flexibility inherent in juvenile disposition
should (or could) result in a death sentence which could not be
imposed on an adult in similar circumstances." The unspoken assump-
tion of Justice Fortas's opinion, therefore, was that the underlying
rehabilitative premises of the juvenile court system must cause any
sentencing disparities between the two systems of justice to redound
to the benefit of the offender sentenced by a juvenile court."
5° Id. at 542, 553, 565. Kent was the first in a series of opinions by Justice Fortas that
emphasized the constitutional rights of children in a number of contexts. In addition to the
opinions in Kent and Gault, discussed here, Justice Fortas wrote the frequently cited opinion
stating that children do not "shed their constitutional rights „ at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding that the First
Amendment protects nondisruptive student speech in schools). Laura Kalman discusses Tinker
as a statement of Justice Fortas's views on the First Amendment and political dissent, but dues
not relate his opinion in Tinker to her observation that he sought to "enfranchis(el outsiders"—
including alcoholics, criminals and children, LAURA KALMAN, ARE Foams: A BIOGRAPHY 250,
286 (1990),
51 Kent, 383 U.S. at 553-54. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Black, Harlan and White,
dissented on the narrow ground that the statute at issue related only to the District of Columbia.
Id. at 568 (Stewart, J., dissenting) For that reason, the dissenters argued, the opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia should be left undisturbed. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
The majority explained that Kent's right to a hearing in juvenile court stemmed from the
jurisdictional "statute read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process." Id.
at 557.
52 Id. at 557.
55 Id. at 556-57; see also United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1339-40 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(Wright, J., dissenting).
54 Ironically, juveniles do not always benefit from the distinction. The goal of rehabilitation
has sometimes served as a rationale for allowing courts to impose longer sentences on minors
than on similarly situated adults. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 5035, 5039 (1994) (juvenile delinquency
act). This statute was discussed in Brief For Petitioner at 24-25, United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S.
291 (1992) (No. 90-1577) ("Ill t would not be inequitable or unconstitutional for a juvenile to
be committed for a longer period of confinement than an adult convicted of the same offense"
because commitment of juveniles is designed to "rehabilitate, not punish, errant youths, and the
government provides juveniles with special treatment toward that goal.") (citing authorities for
evaluating age-based distinction under a rational basis test). The Supreme Court of Wyoming,
for example, ruled in the Matter of AL] that a juvenile court could: (i) sentence a minor to a
period of probation three times longer than that applicable to a similarly situated adult and
longer than the maximum prison term for the underlying offense; (ii) order that the minor be
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The theoretical significance of Kent, however, cannot be fully
mined by analysts who stop at Justice Fortas's opinion. On remand, the
district court approved the original 1961 waiver of juvenile court juris-
diction over Morris Kent, but the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed." The rich, yet rarely cited, opinion for the Court
of Appeals by Chief Judge David L. Bazelon elaborated on some of the
themes explored by Justice Fortas, with a particular emphasis On fram-
ing an appropriate disposition." Chief Judge Bazelon expressly con-
cluded: "[i] t seems clear that the chief reason for waiver was that the
juvenile court could retain jurisdiction over Kent for only five years
and that he was unlikely to recover within this period." 57 Chief Judge
Bazelon criticized the "paradoxical result" of the lower court's ap-
proach to waiver: "the sicker a juvenile is, the less care he receives from
the juvenile court."58
 Instead, he explained, a child would invariably be
subjected to the "strains and stresses" of criminal prosecution because
no one can guarantee he will recover by age twenty-one. 59 The Court
of Appeals rejected the trial court's approach, which it characterized
subjected to intrusive searches (including urinalysis and residential checks) during the proba-
tionary period without any showing of the "reasonable suspicion" required to search an adult
probationer; and (iii) revoke the minor's driving privileges. 836 P.2d 307,311-13 (Wyo. 1992).
Ali was charged with pointing an unloaded weapon at acquaintances during a party. Id. at 309.
Under the criminal code, an adult charged with the same act (a misdemeanor) was subject to a
maximum probation of one year. Id. at 313. Ag received five days of confinement and "triple"
probation of three years; violation of probation would expose ALj to incarceration in the boys'
training school for a period as long as seven months into his majority. Id. at 323 (Urbigkit, CJ.,
dissenting in part),
55 401 F.2d 408,409,412 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The district court determined that on remand the
1961 waiver was "appropriate and proper," presumably in light of determinative factors set forth
in a policy memorandum issued by the District's Juvenile Court judge, that was appended to the
opinion of the Supreme Court in Kent. Id. at 409; see Kent, 383 U.S. at 565-68 (factors to be
weighed in deciding whether to transfer a juvenile to criminal court—later labeled the "Kent
factors"—include the seriousness of the offense, level of violence and premeditation, whether
personal injury resulted, whether evidence exists supporting an indictment, presence of adult
co-defendants, the juvenile's "sophistication and maturity," the juvenile's record in the justice
system, and prospects for rehabilitation through facilities "currently available to the juvenile
court").
56 A search of the major law reviews included in standardized services indicates that not a
single commentator has discussed Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion in Kent. Chief judge Bazelon,
however, considered it important enough to devote a chapter of one of his book to excerpts from
his opinions in Kent before it reached the Supreme Court and after remand. DAVID L. BAZELON,
QUESTIONING AUTHORITY: JUSTICE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 129-36 (1988). Only one article even
notes the existence of the opinion. McCarthy, supra note 30, at 653 n.123 (noting that after
remand the Court of Appeals "concluded that Kent should have been civilly committed").
57 Kent, 401 F.2d at 412.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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as taking an unnecessarily restrictive view of the procedures available
to preserve public safety:
[T] his harsh result might be justified if there is no other way
to protect society. But it is clear that society can be protected
without departing from civilized standards for the prompt
and adequate care of disturbed children. The juvenile court
can institute civil commitment proceedings against the young-
ster. If commitment ensues, he will be confined and treated
until he is no longer dangerous due to mental illness. If not,
the juvenile court will be free to follow its usual procedures. 6°
Chief Judge Bazelon also noted that if civil commitment to a
psychiatric facility resulted in release before age twenty-one, Morris
would have remained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and
the juvenile court could have reinstated charges, presumably with a
renewed opportunity to waive Morris into criminal court. 61 The Court
of Appeals vacated the initial waiver and the criminal conviction, but
advised the government that it could still institute civil commitment
proceedings against Morris 62—who by then was twenty-three years old. 63
Chief Judge Bazelon explained that the legitimacy of the juvenile
justice system depended on its ability to protect the safety of the public.
"Parens patriae," he emphasized, "requires that the juvenile court do
what is best for the child's care and rehabilitation so long as this
disposition provides adequate protection for society." 64 He concluded that
it was possible—and essential—to achieve both goals for Morris Kent
within the framework of juvenile court. 65 Chief Judge Bazelon, widely
and justifiably regarded as a leading liberal judge, took a solicitous
interest both in the young and in mental illness. 66 He never, however,
lost sight of the conditional terms of the rehabilitative ideal. Rehabili-
61' Id. (footnote omitted). To be sure, the civil commitment process for persons accused of
crimes raises its own civil liberties issues. See, e.g., David W. Burgett, Substantive Due Process Limits
on the Duration of Civil Commitment for the Treatment of Mental Illness, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
205 (1981); Grant H. Morris, The Supreme Court Examines Civil Commitment Issues: A Retrospective
and Prospective Assessment, 60 Ttn... L. REV. 927 (1986). But Morris Kent would undoubtedly have
preferred an indeterminate psychiatric commitment to a criminal sentence of up to 90 years.
GI See Kent, 401 F.2d at 410.
62 1d. at 412.
63 Id. at 413 n.1 (Burger, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 411 (second emphasis added).
65 Id. at 412.
66 Abner Mikva, The Real Judge Bazelon, 82 GEO. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1993); see also Martha Minow,
Questioning Our Policies: Judge David L. Bazelon's Legacy for Mental Health Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 7
(1993).
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tation—a gift of the state—was possible only after meeting the security
needs of society. Because Chief Judge Bazelon was convinced that the
juvenile court could assure that Morris would remain confined for
"treatment for as long as the public safety requires," he concluded that
the condition precedent for retaining juvenile court jurisdiction had
been satisfied.° The solution crafted in Kent resembles the statutory
provisions for extended jurisdiction of juvenile courts recently enacted
in several states that allow juveniles to be detained beyond the age of
majority based on an adjudication by a juvenile court where necessary
to protect the public. 68
Although on its face, Kent concerns only procedural rights, when
properly understood, it illuminates the central conflicts that surround
juvenile justice. Considered together as a thematic statement, the opin-
ions of Justice Fortas and Chief Judge Bazelon underscore that no
artificial division exists between rehabilitation and punishment, ther-
apy and retribution, or rights and responsibilities. According to the
vision in these opinions, Morris Kent could exercise his right to appear
before a juvenile court which could find an appropriate way to provide
him with treatment and still protect the public until Morris was able
to meet his responsibilities to society. Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion
makes clear that the procedural questions decided by the Supreme
Court do not even arise unless the juvenile court lacks the ability to
structure a proportionate response: only if the juvenile court cannot
protect all of the individual and societal interests involved would a boy
like Morris have the occasion to assert his right to procedures designed
to ensure that he did not lose his right to a hearing in juvenile court
without due process protections.
Protection of society was hardly at issue in In re Gault, the seminal
case that addressed the widespread procedural shortcomings of the
67 Kent, 401 F.2d at 412. Future Supreme Court Chief justice Burger, sitting on the panel
with Chief judge Bazelon, disagreed. Id. at 413 (Burger, J., dissenting). He emphasized that
Morris's entire juvenile record, including his "entire social and psychiatric file" revealed that the
supposed — child'" before the court was "a dangerous pet -son who has committed numerous grave
crimes of violence." Id. at 413 & n.1 (Burger, j., dissenting). Therefore, he feared that Morris
might be released by a doctor if confined under the terms of a civil commitment, and argued
that greater protection for society was warranted. Id. at 414 (Burger, J., dissenting).
418 See, e.g., CAL. WELT. & INsT, Cone: § 607(b) (West Supp. 1995) (allowing extension of
jurisdiction to age 25); MINN. STAT. ANN, § 260.126 (West 1995) (where minors over age 14 are
accused of felony offenses, and certain conditions are met, upon adjudication of delinquency the
court may impose both a juvenile and an adult sentence, but the adult sentence shall be stayed
until and unless the juvenile violates the terms of the adjudication or commits a new offense, at
which time the offender is entitled to a summary revocation hearing); TEX. FAM. Coin?. ANN.
§ 54.04(d) (3) (West 1992) (allowing extension of jurisdiction for up to 40 years for enumerated
serious and violent offenses); see also Martin, .supra note 28, at 60-61, 84-87.
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juvenile justice system. 69 Gault can be viewed as the mirror image of
Kent trial courts in each instance imposed what the Justices viewed as
unreasonable penalties on minors, one by retaining juvenile jurisdic-
tion, the other by waiving it. The fundamental issue of disposition was
central to both cases. In Gault, the juvenile court committed fifteen-
year-old Gerald Gault to the State Industrial School until the age of
majority for the childhood prank of making an indecent telephone
call to a woman neighbor. 7 ' If Gerald had been over eighteen, and had
committed the same offense, the maximum penalty a criminal court
could have imposed was a fine of between five and fifty dollars or
imprisonment for not more than two months—and Gerald would have
received a full array of procedural guarantees. 7 ' Instead, young Gerald
faced six years of confinement in an "industrial school," which the
majority concluded amounted to incarceration "no matter how euphe-
mistic the title."72 The perception that Gerald received unacceptably
harsh punishment in juvenile court—far beyond what could be meted
out to an adult—framed Justice Fortas's analysis for the majority." In
light of the significant deprivation of liberty Gerald faced in juvenile
court, the Court in Gault held that even in that unique forum he was
entitled to numerous due process rights. 74
Legal scholars interested in juvenile disposition have largely con-
fined themselves to Gault's procedural holdings, ignoring the focus on
69 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
70 1d. at 3, 7-8.
7t
	 at 29.
72 Id. at 27.
79 Six members of the Court agreed with all of the holdings in Gault, but only five Justices
signed the entire majority opinion. Justice Black concurred, but wrote separately to express his
belief that "the guarantees of all the provisions of the Bill of Rights" apply to all persons, whether
"infant or adult, [who] can be seized by the State, charged, and convicted for violating a state
criminal law, and then ordered by the State to be confined for six years." Id. at 59, 61 (Black, J.,
concurring), Justice White joined all but Part V of the majority opinion, which held that the
constitutional privileges of confrontation, self-incrimination and cross-examination apply to chil-
dren; he believed the Court should not have reached those questions on the scant record available
to it. Id. at 64 (White, J., concurring) (expressly agreeing that the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination applies at the adjudicatory stage of juvenile proceedings). Justice Harlan agreed
with much of the reasoning in the majority opinion, but disagreed with the procedural balance
struck by the majority. Id. at 65-78 (Harlan, J,, concurring in part, dissenting in part) lie would
have imposed only three procedural requirements on juvenile courts: timely notice of the charges;
"unequivocal and timely notice" of a right to counsel accompanied by provision of counsel to
indigents; and creation of a record adequate to permit appellate review. Id. at 72 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Only Justice Stewart dissented. Id. at 78-81 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (juvenile proceedings are not adversarial and, in any event, the questions presented
did not arise on this record since Gerald's parents knew of "their right" to counsel and other
protections at issue).





disposition within the Court's reasoning. They have thereby underes-
timated the significance of the disproportionate sentence Gerald re-
ceived to the procedural "revolution" wrought in Gault. 75 For instance,
one leading commentator omits Gerald's actual disposition from a list
of factors that contributed to the Court's decision in Gault. 75 He argues
that the Court crafted a narrow decision, "without considering .. .
[the] dispositional practices of the juvenile justice system."" Similarly,
historians, trying to place judicial writings in context, discuss Gault
without attention to Gerald's incarceration." But Justice Black, concur-
ring in Gault, put it plainly, underscoring his concern that children
who are "subject to heavier punishments, could, because they are children,
be denied ... constitutional safeguards."'
The thirty-page "preface" to Justice Fortas's opinion, a classic essay
about the dreams and disappointments of the juvenile court, is some-
thing more than obiter dicta: it comprises the lens through which the
Justices evaluated Gerald's fate. They concluded that "[t] he absence of
75 Kent v. United States, 401 F.2(.1 408, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The list of commentators on
Gault is voluminous. See, e.g., SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 1-4, 6-92 (2d ed. 1994) (not mentioning disposition and concluding that "procedural
arbitrariness" made the Gault decision inevitable, but noting that the Court recognized the risk
that adjudicated delinquents would enter adult penal institutions); Fox, supra note 7, at 1235-36
(analyzing Gault as procedural reform that naively overlooks the social control impulses of
nineteenth-century reformers, without mentioning Gerald's disposition); Jonathan Simon, Power
Without Parents: Juvenile Justice in a Postmodern Society, 16 CARnozo L. Rev, 1363, 1393, 1401
(1995) (observing that Gerald received a six-year sentence, but not discussing its importance to
the Court's reasoning, and discussing Gault as a case about "procedural shift"). Lee Teitelbaum
cites Gerald's commitment for an unnamed misdemeanor as example of dissociation between
behavior and disposition in the untamed juvenile court, but does not relate that dissociation to
the result in Gault. Teitelbaum, supra note 43, at 363 & n.36. An important exception is Robert
Schwartz, who brought his provocative unpublished analysis to my attention shortly before this
article went to press. lie observed that the disproportionate penalty imposed on Gerald compared
to similarly situated adults "caught the Court's attention, and led it to revisit the fairness of
juvenile court proceedings." Robert G. Schwartz, Another Perspective: The Nation and Other
States, Address to the Association for Children of New Jersey 15-16 (Nov. 21, 1994) (transcript
on file with author) (speculating that in Gault the Justices sought to ensure that intervention
matched the individual child and the offense).
76 Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and
the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 826-27 (1988) (arguing for abolition of the juvenile
court on the ground, among others, that in its current incarnation it too closely resembles
criminal court, but fails to grant the full panoply of rights, and has failed to resolve inherent
tensions between punishment and treatment).
" Id. Feld elsewhere notes Gerald's sentence in passing, but does not comment on it in his
extensive discussion of the case. BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
AND THE JUVENILE Comm 18 (1993).
" See, e.g., Ptivrr, supra note 4, at 161-63 (no reference to disposition); RYERSON, supra note
4, at 149-51 (noting in passing that Gerald's parents failed to achieve his release from the
industrial school to which Ile had been committed).
" In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 61 (1967) (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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procedural rules based upon constitutional principles has not always
produced fair, efficient and effective procedures." 8° "Departures from
established principles of due process," Justice Fortas emphasized, "have
frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrari-
ness."tl 1
 Justice Fortas proceeded from an awareness of the constraints
on judicial authority, apparent at least since Chief Justice Marshall
explained the limits of judicial discretion: discretionary choices are
left, "not to [a court's] inclination, but to its judgment; and its judg-
ment is to be guided by sound legal principles." 82 When arbitrariness
results from abuse of discretion, Justice Fortas made clear, society loses
collectively along with the individual whose rights are compromised.
"Due process of law," he explained, "is the primary and indispensable
foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in
the social compact which ... delimits the powers which the state may
exercise."83
Justice Fortas repeatedly noted the divergence of reality and rheto-
ric in the juvenile court system. 84 His majority opinion "confront[ed]
the reality" of the cavalier treatment Gerald received in juvenile court. 85
The Justices were fully cognizant of the decision's symbolic impor-
tance. Discretion bled over into arbitrariness, the Court held, when,
under the guise of special protection, Gerald was taken into custody
without any notice to his parents, was charged in writing only with
needing protection of the court, and had a hearing at which the
complainant did not appear, not a single witness was sworn, and noth-
ing was recorded in any way.86 Even after sentencing Gerald, the trial
judge was unable to specify what section of the code he found Gerald
had violated to render him delinquent. 87 The judge later testified that
he was uncertain whether Gerald's behavior constituted disturbing the
peace or habitual immoral behavior." Ultimately, the Supreme Court
criticized the trial judge for treating Gerald's case as if it were simply
"any charge of violation of a penal statute" and for failing to use his
discretion to explore whether Gerald's apparently stable household-
8° Id. at 18.
81 Id. at 18-19.
82 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (Marshall, CJ.).
83 Gault, 387 U.S. at 20.
84 Id. at 30 (quoting STAN' ION WHEELER & FRED CO'ITRELI„ JUVENILE DELINQUENCY-ITS
PREVENTION AND CONTROL 18, 21-22,24 (1966)).
88 Id. at 27.
86 Id. at 5.
87 Id. at 8 0.5.
88 Gault, 387 U.S. at 8 n.5.
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consisting of two working parents and an older brother—could provide
suitable supervision for rehabilitation."
Rumor, innuendo, and unfounded charges all helped to deter-
mine Gerald's sentence."" justice Fortas painted a picture of discretion
run riot by detailing how the juvenile court judge considered a prior
vague "referral" about the theft of a baseball glove a factor relevant to
Gerald's disposition.91
 The referral, the Court underscored, led to "no
hearing,' and no accusation' ... 'because of lack of material founda-
tion.'""2
 Yet it contributed to Gerald's incarceration."
While it appeared to condemn such capriciousness masquerading
as exercise of discretion, the majority expressly reserved opinion on
the question of the "post-adjudication disposition" of juveniles which
it deemed "unique to the juvenile process.'`94
 By inference the Court
did not reach the role of discretion in disposition.'' In dicta, the
majority voiced several preliminary concerns about disposition, which
the Court has not yet considered directly. For example, Justice Fortas
observed that the strengths and risks of the juvenile system were mag-
nified at the disposition stage, where the "opportunity" for "individu-
alized treatment plans" was ripest, but where the opportunity was
accompanied by the "danger" inherent in the "court's coercive powers." 9"
Justice Fortas also used Gault as an occasion to ask whether the
juvenile justice system lived up to its promise to rehabilitate young
offenders, citing research on the "'bankruptcy of dispositional resources'
within the juvenile justice system.'? He wondered whether, to the extent
that reduced procedural protections are justified as a legitimate ex-
" Id. at 28-29,
" Id. at 9.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Gault, 387 U.S. at 9.
94 Id. at 31 n.48,
95 Id. at 13, 27, 31 n,48.
99 Id. at 39 n.65 (counsel is needed at disposition to ensure that the juvenile court exercises
its discretion with "adequate knowledge of the circumstances"), Then, as now, inadequate re-
sources undermined the juvenile justice system. Judges with severely overcrowded thickets cannot
be expected to render thoughtful, individualized justice. See id. at 66 n.2 (Harian, j,, concurring
in part, dissenting in part) (noting "many of the critics have asserted that the deficiencies of
juvenile courts have stemmed chiefly from the inadequacy of the personnel and resources
available to those courts" and citing Monrad G. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional
Context juvenile Cases, 1966 Sue, (r. Rev. 167, 191-92); Ciffl.DREN AT RISK, supra note 5, at
53 (judges hearing delinquency cases in Chicago make as many as 1700 decisions a month); Mark
I. Soler, Re-Imagining theJuveni le Court, in CHILD, PARENT, AND STATE 596, 601 (S. Randall liumm
et al. eds., 1994) (discussing the "pervasive inadequacy" of services and programs for children
and the potential of juvenile courts in coordinating services).
97 Gault, 387 U.S. at 22 n.30. Chiefjudge Bazelon voiced a similar concern in 1-laziel v. United
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change for "special consideration and treatment[) . . . there is reason
to doubt that juveniles always receive the benefits of such a quid pro
quo.'" As a direct corollary, Justice Fortas noted with approval several
lower court decisions indicating that "appropriate treatment is essen-
tial to the validity of juvenile custody" in light of diminished procedural
protections.99 Unfortunately, Justice Fortas never had a further oppor-
tunity to develop the vision of juvenile justice implicit in these obser-
vations.
In the post-Gault era, however, several lower court judges have
pursued Justice Fortas's insight. They have held that the denial of the
full panoply of procedures available to adults—such as jury trials—
based on the juvenile court's rehabilitative goals for minors might
entitle confined adjudicated delinquents to placement in facilities that
offer a prospect of rehabilitation. Some judges, noting that juveniles
adjudicated delinquent have not been convicted of a crime, have relied
on the Supreme Court's holding in the context of mental illness that,
absent a criminal conviction, a reasonable relationship must exist be-
tween the purpose for which an individual is deprived of liberty and
the treatment accorded that individual.' 00 Applying that rationale to
juveniles, some post- Gault courts have held that conditions at state
training schools must be reasonably related to the statutory purpose
of confinement, which they held to be treatment and rehabilitation
according to legislative statements of purpose.m Recently, a district
court in South Carolina held that the state's policy of incarcerating
States, 404 F.2d 1275, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (we "cannot ignore the mockery of a benevolent
statute unbacked by adequate facilities").
98 Gault, 387 U.S. at 22 n.30.
99 Id. at 23 n.30 (citing Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Kautter v. Reid, 183 F.
Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1960); White v. Reid, 125 F. Stipp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954)).
100 Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 796 (D.S.C. 1995) (citing cases relying on Jackson
v, Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)). The Alexander S. court also relied on O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (a state "cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous
individual" but must offer such individuals treatment if that is the purpose of their confinement),
but too swiftly declined to rely on an express "quid pro quo" argument because it unnecessarily
emphasized Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 584-89 (specifically
rejecting a quid pro quo analysis where he doubted that treatment constituted the sole reason
for petitioner mental patient's confinement). Alexander S., 876 F. Supp. at 796 n.43.
1 ° 1 Alexander S,, 876 F. Supp. at 781, 796 Sc n.43 (purpose of incarcerating juveniles under
state law is "beneficent" rather than punitive); accord Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1135
(S.D. Miss. 1977) (same, cited by Alexander S.); Pena v. New York State Div, for Youth, 419 F.
Supp. 203, 206-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (same, cited by Alexander S.); see also Martarella v. Kelley, 349
F, Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (nondelinquent minors confined as persons in need of
supervision are entitled to receive adequate treatment). Contra Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172,
1176-77 (1st Cir. 1983) (noting in dicta that juveniles have no constitutional right to rehabilitative
treatment in confinement since rehabilitation is not the only legitimate goal of such confinement,
but affirming an injunction designed to further a constitutional right to safe conditions in
confinement), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984); Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 997-98 (5th
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juveniles for the purpose of rehabilitation provided a constitutional
claim to rehabilitative treatment as well as to reasonably safe condi-
tions, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint and "minimally ade-
quate training"'" in order to provide "a reasonable opportunity to
accomplish the purpose of their confinement . . and to ensure the
safety of the community once the juveniles are ultimately released,"
through programs that, among other things, develop "a positive sense
of accomplishment." Such decisions do not stem from a desire to
coddle young criminals; they represent a vision of juvenile justice
anticipated by Chief Judge Bazelon's advice that courts should strive
to respond to the desperate need of delinquent youth to be offered
"some reason to hope that they are not the losers that society has
labeled them. 104
HI. CONCLUSION
Critics of the juvenile justice system attack it for punishing too
lightly or too harshly, for according too much procedure or too little.
Based on diametrically opposed yet equally stark models of reality,
those critics posit that juvenile courts are confronted with inherently
incompatible demands. The tempting simplicity of this view wrongly
dominates arguments over the viability of the juvenile court. The
Cir. 1977) (the Eighth Amendment provides sufficient protection against abusive conditions, and
approaches to treatment are open to discretionary interpretation); but see Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 669 n.37 (1971) (expressly reserving the question of whether the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to juvenile institutions).
Courts have generally been more reluctant to accept the legal theory of a right to treatment
in a variety of contexts since the Supreme Court held that a profoundly retarded adult confined
to state facilities only had a right to "minimally adequate or reasonable training." Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). For a discussion of the deference frequently accorded treatment
plans under Youngberg, see MARK SOLER, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT, 1 1.05131 (1995).
1112 Alexander S., 876 F. Supp. at 795, 798 (ordering the state to develop and implement a
plan to reduce severe, unconstitutional overcrowding; provide sufficient numbers of trained staff,
including juvenile corrections officers, social workers, and psychologists to "adequately supervise
and rehabilitate juveniles"; identify and develop appropriate programs for the estimated 50% of
all inmates who require special education; and provide basic medical care).
1 °5 1d. at 790. Surveys suggest that the conditions at issue in Alexander S. are fitr from unique,
but rather resemble conditions at juvenile correctional institutions around the country. A recent
Justice Deparunent survey of conditions of confinement for juveniles, for example, reveals serious
inadequacies in basic care. DALE G. PARENT ET AL., CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: JUVENILE
JUSTICE DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS FACILITIES 43-68 (1994). In 1991, nearly half of confined
juveniles lived in overcrowded facilities, with an average population reaching 120% of design
capacity. Id. The study concluded that "substantial and widespread" problems exist in juvenile
facilities, "most notably [in] living space, health care, security [including safety from attack within
the facility] and control of suicidal behavior." Id. at 5. Such conditions are incompatible with
rehabilitation and, thus, with the long term goal of protecting the public.
1 °4 11a/fel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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debate suffers from a failure to recognize the far more complex view
captured in the foundation jurisprudence of the post-Gault juvenile
justice system.
In arguing that the goals of rehabilitation and punishment are
fundamentally in conflict, critics of the juvenile justice system uni-
formly ignore how central concern about appropriate disposition was
to the reasoning of the jurists who fashioned modern juvenile justice.
The normative foundation of the post-Gaull juvenile justice system—
responsible disposition, that is, disposition responsible to both the
child and society—demands satisfaction of two conditions. First, the
jurisprudential vision reflected in the opinions of Justice Fortas and
Chief Judge Bazelon emphasized that confinement as a result of juve-
nile court proceedings—with their reduced procedural protections—is
conditioned on providing a minimum threshold of rehabilitation. But
the reasoning did not stop there. The second prong of the reasoning
makes clear that an adjudicated delinquent's claim to rehabilitation is
conditioned, in turn, on the availability and use of appropriate sanc-
tions to protect the public. This dual conditionality of rehabilitation
and proportional retribution serves as a prerequisite to the constitu-
tional exercise of judicial discretion in the juvenile court. It defines the
parameters of legitimate discretion in that forum. Judges may some-
times, even often, fail to satisfy these dual conditions, but failure to
satisfy the conditions in no way vitiates their normative force.
The modern regime of juvenile justice was intended to harmonize
many needs—indeed the ability to accommodate diverse goals is a
measure of its success. Despite widespread misunderstandings about
the proper balance of competing claims, guided discretion does not
erect barriers to dispositions that balance rehabilitation with punish-
ment, therapy with retribution, or rights with responsibilities. The
pragmatic vision that underlay the foundation cases never contem-
plated that these categories might be perceived as antithetical or even
discordant. On the contrary, the emphasis on disposition called for
judges to weigh—and ultimately harmonize—competing claims in craft-
ing concrete decisions.
A vivid testimony to the guidance Kent and Gault provide for
courts considering dispositions is found in a recent District of Colum-
bia case, Matter of 14.'"5 Fifteen-year-old 1-1, on probation for drug
dealing and on pretrial release for alleged assault with intent to kill
eleven people at a Masonic Temple, sprayed an automatic weapon into
a car in which two men sat. 106 This was not, as the court put it, a case
105 546 A.2d 429, 436-38 (D.C. 1988).
1(16 Id. at 431, 433.
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of "truancy or public urination or shoplifting. . . . The potential for
tragedy was fearsome." 1 °7
 Under these circumstances, an appellate court
upheld a juvenile court judge's refusal to release L.J. from a juvenile
facility, despite an assurance by Lj.'s therapists that U. had been
sufficiently rehabilitated to leave.m Lj.'s loss of liberty, the court con-
cluded, sent a powerful message to the youngster and to his friends
who remained at liberty in the community.'" Meanwhile, L.J. received
intensive therapeutic interventions in a juvenile facility."" The struc-
ture provided in detention led to the best performance in Lj.'s life."'
The court concluded that detention may have saved L.J.'s life: his
accomplice was shot to death while L.J. was locked up." 2 L.J.'s ultimate
fate underscores the juvenile justice system's potential for penal sanc-
tions recognizable as punishment even when they accompany rehabili-
tative measures." 3
None of the safeguards against unconstrained judicial discretion
initiated by Kent and Gault or built into the post-Gault regime require
or even suggest that "rehabilitation" and appropriate "retribution" are
mutually exclusive categories. To the contrary, the very concept of
rehabilitation may include a serious message that consequences follow
conduct. As the court underscored in L.J.'s case, meaningful rehabili-
tation may even require precisely that message. When children commit
heinous crimes, swift and definite punishment is an essential part of
both "justice" and "rehabilitation." Indeed, the crafting of reasonable
sanctions has been and remains an essential part of the jurisprudence
of modern juvenile justice.
107 Id. at 433 (Schwelb, j.). Later in the opinion, judge Schwelb quotes Chief judge liazelon's
opinion in Kent regarding the importance of protecting society. Id. at 437.
1 °8 Id. at 431,433.
109 Id. at 439-40.
II" / 	 A.2d at 439.
In Id. at 433-34.
112 1d. at 439.
1 "/ Social science research supports the notion that the small proportion of juvenile offenders
who commit the bulk of serious, violent juvenile crimes must be identified early and receive
comprehensive, intense treatment and rehabilitation. The research, tind the juvenile justice
policies it supports, are summarized in °Filch of juvrixtrE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVEN-
TION, FOR IMPLEMENTING THE COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND
CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS (1995). At the same time, recent research supports calls for
graduated sanctions designated to respond to the offense and the history or the individual that
combine treatment and rehabilitation with reasonable sanctions. Id. Such graduated sanctions
culminate in secure detention for the most violent offenders. Id. These latest attempts to formu-
late a workable protocol for responding to juvenile delinquency are perfectly consistent with the
framework sketched out in Kent and Gault nearly two decades ago. See supra notes 4'2-104 and
accompanying text.
